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Haida Nation and Taku River:
A Commentary on Aboriginal
Consultation and Reconciliation
E. Ria Tzimas*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada released its
two landmark decisions on Aboriginal consultation. Haida Nation v.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests),1 and Taku River Tlingit First
Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),2 together,
provide the most significant discussion to date by the Court on Aboriginal consultation. The main issue before the Court was very narrow: did
the governments have an obligation to consult Aboriginal peoples over
government authorized activities in instances where the Aboriginal
rights were unknown, uncertain, or in dispute, and if so, the extent of
that obligation. Uncertainty over the existence or extent of an asserted
right made it difficult to draw conclusions with any certainty over the
extent of any potential infringement, and the further extent of what
might amount to an appropriate interim agreement or accommodation.
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that where the Crown,
federal or provincial, has “knowledge, real or constructive,” of the potential existence of an Aboriginal right, title or a treaty right, and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect that right or title, the
honour of the Crown requires the Crown to consult and in some circumstances accommodate that interest. The content and extent of the consultation and possible accommodation is determined by both the strength of
the asserted interest and the degree of the potential infringement of the

*
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the
views of the Government of Ontario.
1
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [hereinafter “Haida”].
2
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [hereinafter “Taku River”].

462

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

intended government action. The Court also concluded that Aboriginal
claimants should advance their claims with clarity, focusing on the
scope and nature of the rights they assert and on the alleged infringements. The obligation by the Crown to accommodate was defined as
seeking a compromise or “harmonizing conflicting interests” so as to
move “further down the path of reconciliation.” In its analysis of the
scope and content of consultation, the Court acknowledged that the
strength of asserted claims may vary and therefore articulated a corresponding consultation spectrum, ranging from notification to accommodation. With respect to third parties who are typically the proponents
seeking government authorization for their actions, whether an approval
of a project, a licence, or some other regular intervention, the Court
reversed the B.C. Court of Appeal’s conclusion that they shared in the
duty to consult. Instead, the Court signaled that third parties might have
specific obligations assigned to them to assist with the overall consultation process. Although governments could not delegate their constitutional duties to consult Aboriginal people, they could use their
legislative capacity to involve third parties in the conduct of effective
consultations.
There can be little doubt that the two judgments have and will continue to have profound implications on the governments’ conduct, not
only vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples but in their overall interaction and
balancing of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal public interests. However,
it is far from obvious that the judgments reflect quite the constitutional
paradigm shift suggested by Professor Slattery, or that they provide a
basis for questioning provincial jurisdiction even in the face of Aboriginal title assertions. What is clear is that the judgments are grounded
firmly on the existing jurisprudence not only as it concerns Aboriginal
disputes, but more broadly speaking as it concerns the overall operation
of the Canadian Constitution. This is reflected in the extent to which the
Court focused on reconciliation as the endpoint of any consultation. Be
it the balancing of interests, the give and take by both sides, accommodation and sharing, the Court’s clear message is to urge everyone to
work together within the existing constitutional structure to find common ground and common solutions. That message is neither unique to
Aboriginal disputes nor new to the constitutional discourse. The Court
discussed reconciliation as a key animus of the Constitution in Refer-
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ence re Secession of Quebec.3 In Haida and in Taku River the Court
anchored its analysis on the view that the diversity of interests, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike can be reconciled within the unity of the
principles of federalism encompassed by the Constitution. When viewed
from that perspective, although the analysis and questions raised by
professors Slattery and McNeil are challenging and provocative, it is
doubtful that this Court would look to either a paradigm shift or a radical change on questions of jurisdiction to address Aboriginal concerns.
The more likely progression will be to continue to find solutions within
the four corners of the Constitution.
The following is a commentary on the analysis and conclusions offered by professors Slattery and McNeil. To bring the discussion into
focus, the first part offers an overview of the two cases. The second part
analyzes the key components of the two judgments with reference and
contrasts to the suggestions and analyses offered by professors Slattery
and McNeil. The third part takes a close look at the Court’s emerging
vision of reconciliation and considers the ingredients that might be required to effect reconciliation in the context of Aboriginal concerns. The
commentary concludes with some thoughts on where the discussion
concerning Aboriginal consultation and reconciliation is likely to go and
what the future challenges might be.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA’S DECISIONS IN HAIDA NATION AND
TAKU RIVER TLINGIT FIRST NATION
1. Background
Both Haida and Taku River concerned Aboriginal consultation in
instances where the existence and extent of alleged Aboriginal title
rights were uncertain and in dispute. In both instances, British Columbia
took the position that there could be no duty to consult under section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982, until the existence of Aboriginal title was
proven in Court. This resulted in a tension over when to consult, what to
consult about in the face of uncertainty, how to account for asserted
3

[1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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rights, and what kinds of interim solutions might be reached to respond
to the concerns in the least disruptive ways. The background and the
particular histories of the cases are useful to understand, as they set up
the context against which the Court articulated its conclusions on consultation.
(a) Taku River Tlingit First Nation
At issue in Taku River was a project by Redfern Resources Ltd. to
re-open the Tulsequah Chief Mine, previously operated by Cominco
Ltd. in the 1950s. Redfern intended to extract approximately 2,500
tonnes of ore per day. The mine is located in northern British Columbia
near the border between the Yukon Territory and the state of Alaska. A
controversial aspect of the project centred on Redfern’s stated plan to
build an access road to the mine site to haul the ore from the Tulsequah
Chief Mine to the Town of Atlin. The road would cross a portion of the
traditional territory of the Tlingit First Nation where the First Nation’s
traditional land use activities were most concentrated. Although the area
is not covered by treaty, at the relevant time the area was the subject of
treaty negotiations between the Tlingit and the governments of Canada
and British Columbia. The Court also noted that the First Nation’s traditional territory encompassed the whole of the Taku River watershed,
and that the Tlingit relied on hunting, fishing and gathering to sustain
themselves.4
In September 1994, Redfern applied for the requisite approval for
the road under B.C.’s Environmental Assessment Act (EAA). A Project
Committee was established under the EAA to review the process and to
make recommendations to the executive director of the Environmental
Assessment Office. Members of the committee included representatives
from the federal and provincial governments as well as the Tlingit. For
three and one half years, the process “apparently accommodated the
expressed needs” of the Tlingit First Nation who at all times asserted
their Aboriginal rights and their concerns about the impact of the proposed road on their cultural habitat and on their treaty negotiations.
Following the production of the Project Committee Report and the Tlingit’s Recommendations Report to the Minister of the Environment,

4

Taku River, supra, note 2, at paras. 30-32.
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Lands and Parks, and the Minister of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, the Ministers issued a Project Approval Certificate, the process
then came to a halt.5
The lower court set aside the Minister’s decision to issue a Project
Approval Certificate. The majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal dismissed the province’s and Redfern’s appeal and held that even in the
face of asserted but not proven rights, the Crown owed a constitutional
and fiduciary duty to consult the Taku River Tlingit First Nation.
(b) Haida Nation
In Haida, the Council of the Haida Nation, the governing body of
the Haida Nation, brought an application for judicial review of several
decisions of the Minister of Forests in 1981, 1995, and 2000 to replace
Tree Farm Licence 39 (T.F.L. 39) and to approve the transfer from
MacMillan Bloedel Limited to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited in
2000. Haida Nation alleged that the Minister acted either without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
Some of the essential facts animating the case were the following:
•
•

•

The Haida have inhabited the Queen Charlotte Islands continuously
from at least 1774 (the time of first contact) to the present;
From at least 1846 to the present the Haida were the only Aboriginal people living on the Queen Charlotte Islands. They never surrendered their Aboriginal rights and always claimed Aboriginal title
to all of the lands comprising the Queen Charlotte Islands; and,
From a time which is uncertain, but that in any event pre-dates 1846
(the time of assertion of British sovereignty) the Haida used red cedar trees from the old-growth forests of the Queen Charlotte Islands
for the construction of canoes, houses, totem poles, masks, boxes
and other objects of art, ceremony and utility, such that red cedar has
always been an integral part of the Haida culture. In the Supreme

5
Based on the submissions before the Supreme Court of Canada, the consultative process
over three and one half years came to a halt, in large measure because the Tlingits were seeking to
veto Redfern’s proposals and were not in fact prepared to come to a compromise. Counsel for the
Tlingit suggested that the Tlingits were seeking “collateral sustainability” and not a veto, but
counsel for Redfern highlighted for the Court correspondence by the Tlingit that spoke of absolute
consent and a veto.
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Court of Canada in their oral submissions, the Haida Nation spoke
of the red cedar as “their sister.”6
Against these facts, the Haida argued that until its title claim is resolved, the Crown has an obligation to treat the lands in question as if
they were encumbered by “Haida Nation title.” The province argued that
there was no obligation to consult until title is proven.
The lower court rejected the notion of a presumptive encumbrance
because it would force the Crown to justify its conduct in relation to an
unproven right. That would have the effect of giving priority to the
Haida interest without an understanding of the extent of the alleged right
claimed. Specifically, the lower Court concluded that the Crown’s fiduciary obligations could not be determined in the absence of a trial on
that issue. In law, without proven rights, the court held that there was no
legal obligation on the part of the province to consult. The lower Court
did speculate that on the strength of the evidence before it, there was
probably a “moral duty to consult.”
The B.C. Court of Appeal rejected the concern over the presumption
of title and the implications for the Crown and instead purported to
“solve” the issue of alleged but not as yet proven rights, by creating a
free-standing obligation to consult grounded in broad notions of the
Crown’s fiduciary obligations. The crucial conclusion on this point was
that:
The duty to consult and seek accommodation does not arise simply
from a Sparrow analysis of s. 35. It stands on the broader fiduciary
footing of the Crown’s relationship with the Indian peoples who are
under its protection.7

And in additional reasons, Lambert J. of the Court of Appeal noted that:
The fiduciary duty of the Crown, federal or provincial, is a duty to
behave towards the Indian people with utmost good faith and to put
the interests of the Indian people under the protection of the Crown so

6
Significantly more detail concerning the history and the circumstances of the Haida Nation is outlined in the lower court decision, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests),
[2000] B.C.J. No. 2427, 36 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 155 (S.G.), at paras. 6 and 24, which were adopted by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1882, and additional reasons at [2002]
B.C.J. No. 378, 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 209 (C.A.).
7
Haida, [2002] B.C.J. No. 378, 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 209, at para. 55 (C.A.).
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that, in cases of conflicting rights, the interests of the Indian people, to
whom the fiduciary duty is owed, must not be subordinated by the
Crown to competing interests of other persons to whom the Crown
owes no fiduciary duty. All the principles which must inform the tests
for justification of a prima facie infringement, such as consultation,
accommodation, and minimal impairment, represent examples of the
Crown’s fiduciary duty to Indian peoples. 8

Grounded on principles of fiduciary law Lambert J. extended the
obligation to consult and to accommodate, not only to the Crown but to
third parties. He used the doctrine of “knowing receipt” to conclude that
by virtue of Weyerhaeuser’s awareness of the Crown fiduciary obligations and by stepping into the relationship, it too would assume fiduciary obligations to the Haida.
2. The Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
British Columbia’s conduct passed Supreme Court scrutiny in Taku
River but failed in Haida. Although admittedly, both the Haida and the
Tlingit presented strong prima facie Aboriginal title and rights assertions, thus eclipsing the concerns raised by several Crowns on the difficulties that uncertain assertions raise, the Supreme Court did not view
the uncertainty over the existence and extent of the asserted rights as an
impediment to consultation. The prospects of constitutionally protected
rights being somehow compromised, even if such rights were undefined
or unclear, made it necessary to err on the side of caution and protect
them. Such protection could be achieved through consultation.
With that view of consultation, the Supreme Court concluded that
British Columbia’s failure to conduct any consultation with the Haida
was fatal. By comparison, in Taku River, where the consultation was
considered “deep,” unfolding over the course of three and one half
years, with continued participation by the Tlingit, the Court concluded
that British Columbia had met its consultation obligations. Moreover, in
the face of the province’s significant efforts to balance the interests of
the Tlingit with those of Redfern, the Court rejected the argument by the
Tlingit to the effect that in the absence of an agreement between them

8

Haida, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1882, 2002 BCCA 462, at para. 62.
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and the province, the consultation efforts were inadequate, and that the
province could not issue the Project Certificate.
The primary value of the two judgments lies in the analytical
framework that the Supreme Court laid out. To appreciate the parameters of that framework, to evaluate the applicability of these judgments
to other factual circumstances, and to consider whether they signal any
shifts in the Aboriginal/constitutional discourse it is necessary to review
the constitutive elements of the judgment: (a) the honour of the Crown;
(b) the timing, scope, and context of the duty to consult and accommodate; (c) the question of provincial jurisdiction; (d) the obligations of
Aboriginal claimants; and (e) the challenge to government conduct.
(a) The Honour of the Crown
The Supreme Court launched its analysis with its conclusion that the
source for the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples over asserted claims lies
in the concept of the honour of the Crown. Historically, “the honour of the
Crown” related to the 19th century English legal principle that the King
could do no wrong.9 The animating idea behind this principle was that the
Crown, as head of the state of England, was a benevolent leader who
would not knowingly aggrieve a subject nor fail to observe a promise.
In the context of Aboriginal cases the Supreme Court of Canada had
previously used the “honour of the Crown” as an interpretative tool to
determine the legal content of treaties, and in particular to resolve ambiguities.10 After 1982, the concept of the honour of the Crown was also
used to describe the content of the legal duties owed by the Crown to

9
In the words of Lord Denman, the benevolent leader would not knowingly aggrieve a
subject nor fail to observe a promise to even “the meanest and most criminal of his subjects,” The
King v. Garside and Mosley (1834), 2 AD. & E. 266, 111 E.R. 103, at 107 and 276 (K.B.).
10
A frequently cited statement of this approach was set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in R. v. Taylor (1982), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, 62 C.C.C (2d) 172, at V, where MacKinnon, A.C.J.O.,
writing for the court, stated:
The principles to be applied to the interpretation of Indian treaties have been much
canvassed over the years. In approaching the terms of a treaty quite apart from the other
considerations already noted, the honour of the Crown is always involved and no appearance of “sharp dealing” should be sanctioned.
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Aboriginal peoples pursuant to section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982. 11
In Haida and Taku River, the honour of the Crown emerged as a
sufficiently fluid concept that it could diffuse the tension between credible but unproven Aboriginal assertions and the potentially negative
impacts of government authorized activities on those assertions. In their
submissions before the Supreme Court, the Haida Nation, Taku River
Tlingit First Nation, and several of the intervener First Nations stated
that governments were using to their advantage either cumbersome and
elaborate treaty processes or lengthy court proceedings to postpone or
prolong the actual recognition and determination of Aboriginal rights,
thereby avoiding consultation obligations and exploiting natural resources without reference or concern for the potential existence of Aboriginal rights and title. If that were allowed to continue, Aboriginal
peoples could face pyrrhic victories. Although their asserted rights
would eventually be recognized, the benefit of those rights, i.e., the
resources, would no longer exist. For their part, many of the governments that participated in the appeal highlighted the difficulties associated with the management of the particular resources at stake with the
understanding and balancing of insufficiently certain Aboriginal assertions, particularly in instances where the assertions were not nearly as
strong as those in the two cases before the Court. The governments
cautioned that the viability of certain resource industries could be at
stake if the consultation threshold was too low.
Against this tension, the attractiveness of the honour of the Crown
as a governing legal concept to the Court is almost obvious. In Taku
River the Court noted:
The duty of honour derives from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty
in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation. It has been enshrined in
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms
existing Aboriginal rights and titles. Section 35(1) has, as one of its
purposes, negotiation of just settlement of Aboriginal claims. In all its
dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown must act honourably, in
accordance with its historical and future relationship with the
Aboriginal peoples in question. The Crown’s honour cannot be

11
See e.g., R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1110, 1114 (Aboriginal rights context); and R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 813 (treaty
rights context).
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interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full effect in
order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1).12

If the honour of the Crown is such that the Crown must always act
honourably and if the exercise of discretionary control by the Crown
raises significant risks that potential Aboriginal interests, which are
embedded in active Aboriginal claims, are at risk of being compromised, then consultation, and where necessary accommodation, is seen
as a significant way of maintaining the Crown’s honour.
The generosity with which the Crown’s honour is to be interpreted
should not obscure the Court’s sensitivity and understanding of the
challenges posed by either uncertain Aboriginal assertions or assertions
in dispute. That sensitivity is reflected in the broad parameters to the
Crown’s honour that are highlighted in both judgments.
First, the Court had no difficulty appreciating the uncertainty of disputed assertions, and as a result, it rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach to consultation as an obligation that is free-standing, grounded in
fiduciary law. Specifically, it stated that the mere assertion of a right
was insufficient to engage the Crown’s honour in a way that required
the Crown to act in the Aboriginal groups’ best interests, as a fiduciary
when it exercised discretionary control over the subject of the asserted
right or title.13
Second, the honour of the Crown, while significant as a source of
government duties and obligations, is shaped by the interaction between
asserted rights that carry potential section 35 protection and government
authorized activities that might affect the asserted rights. In other words,
the honour of the Crown is informed by the potential risk of infringement and the implication of “dishonourable conduct.” If on the one hand
the Crown can do no wrong and on the other there is a risk of a wrong,
then consultation is seen to be capable of preserving the Crown’s honour:
The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that
these rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn,
requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of
negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown
12
13

Taku River Tlingit First Nation, supra, at para. 24.
Haida, supra, note 1, at para. 18.
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may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate
Aboriginal interests. 14

Taken out of context, it is tempting to interpret the Court’s comments as outlining positive duties to identify Aboriginal rights and negotiate with Aboriginal peoples even in the absence of potentially
infringing activities by the government. But in the context of the two
cases, the Court’s direction has to be understood in terms of the government’s potentially infringing conduct. Recalling that in Haida the
determination of the asserted title and right was caught up in a slow and
seemingly unproductive treaty process, the Court signalled that while
the process of negotiation continued, government-authorized activities
that might comprise the content of the assertions could not proceed
without consultation and possibly accommodation. It is far from certain,
however, that in the absence of potentially infringing activities the Court
envisioned that governments would be obligated to initiate negotiations
with Aboriginal peoples.
That the context of the two cases is relevant and that there are contours to the honour of the Crown and to its application is further reflected in the following conclusion:
The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over
Aboriginal interests where clams affecting these interests are being
seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof. It
must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. The Crown is
not rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in
question pending claims resolution. But, depending on the
circumstances, discussed more fully below, the honour of the Crown
may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate
Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally
exploit a claimed resource during the process of proving and resolving
the Aboriginal claim to that resource, may be to deprive the Aboriginal
claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource. That is not
honourable. 15

This analysis is grounded squarely on the Court’s Aboriginal legal
framework that was introduced in Sparrow,16 considered further in cases
14
15
16

Id., at para. 25.
Id., at para. 27 (emphasis added).
Supra, at note 11.
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such as Gladstone17 and in Nikal18 and which culminated in
Delgamuukw19 where the Court noted:
The Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including
Aboriginal title, are not absolute. Those rights may be infringed, both by
the federal (e.g., Sparrow) and provincial (e.g., Côté) governments.20

Acting honourably then, the Crown has to determine, recognize and
respect those claims that have already been established by treaty or
judicial decision or that are either being negotiated or litigated. As those
processes unfold, if Aboriginal interests stemming from those claims
run the risk of being affected by government action, the Crown must act
honourably and in good faith. It must act with integrity, avoiding even
the appearance of sharp dealing. This articulation is consistent with the
approach taken in earlier Aboriginal cases.21
The counterpoint to the obligations emerging out of the Crown’s
honour is the Court’s explicit recognition that the Crown may manage
its resource and address other public interests. In both decisions, the
Court recognizes repeatedly that the Crown must balance Aboriginal
concerns with other societal interests. The Court also acknowledged that
the Crown might have to make decisions in the face of disagreement as
to the adequacy of its response to the Aboriginal concerns. In the face of
a good faith and transparent process, such disagreement would not be
fatal to a Crown decision.22 In fact, the Court explicitly stated, “[m]ere
hard bargaining will not offend an Aboriginal people’s right to be con-

17

R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723.
R. v. Nikal, [1996] S.C.J. No. 47, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013.
19
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
20
Id., at para. 160.
21
In R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, Binnie J. analyzed the
honour of the Crown in the following terms (at para. 49):
…the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with aboriginal people.
This is one of the principles of interpretation set forth in Badger, supra, by Cory J., at para.
41:
... the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Indian people. Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of the
Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appearance of “sharp dealing” will be sanctioned.
See also Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold (1901), 32 S.C.R. 1, at 2.
22
Haida, supra, note 1, at paras. 45, 50, & 61.
18
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sulted.”23 The outcome in Taku River underscored the Court’s analysis
in that case and lent significant credibility to its concern that it offer a
framework that could enable the balancing of Aboriginal interests and
allow the Crown some latitude in the conduct of its affairs.
(b) The Timing, Scope and Content of the Duty to Consult and
Accommodate
Credible but unproven claims are enough to trigger consultation obligations. Honourable conduct, good faith and fair dealing, and the balancing of interests inform the timing, scope, and the content of
consultation. Beginning with the question of when the duty to consult is
triggered, the Court set up a very low threshold. Consultation, and
where necessary accommodation, before the final determination of
claims was described as, “an essential corollary to the honourable process of reconciliation that s. 35 demands.” 24 As a duty that is founded on
the Crown’s honour and the ultimate goal of reconciliation, consultation
is required “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the
potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates
conduct that might adversely affect it.”25 In response to the practical
concern that the very uncertainty over the potential nature of the claim
impedes the ability to meaningfully discuss interim accommodations,
the Court acknowledged the difficulty and responded by drawing a
distinction between the duty to consult and its scope or content and
concluded that:
There is a distinction between knowledge sufficient to trigger a
duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate, and the content or
scope of the duty in a particular case. Knowledge of a credible but
unproven claim suffices to trigger a duty to consult and accommodate.
The content of the duty, however, varies with the circumstances, as
discussed more fully below. A dubious or peripheral claim may attract
a mere duty of notice, while a stronger claim may attract more
stringent duties. The law is capable of differentiating between tenuous
claims, claims possessing a strong prima facie case, and established
claims. Parties can assess these matters, and if they cannot agree,
23
24
25

Haida, id., at para. 42.
Haida, supra, note 1, at para. 38.
Id., at para. 35.
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tribunals and courts can assist. Difficulties associated with the absence
of proof and definition of claims are addressed by assigning
appropriate content to the duty, not by denying the existence of a
duty.26

The Court then explained that the content of the duty to consult
would vary with the circumstances. Explicitly transposing the consultation spectrum articulated by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw27 for cases
where the Aboriginal right was not in dispute, the Court concluded that
the scope of the consultation would be proportionate to a preliminary
assessment of the strength of an Aboriginal assertion and the seriousness
or extent of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed.
That spectrum would allow for the requisite flexibility to conduct good
faith meaningful consultations appropriate to the particular circumstances.28 At one end of the spectrum lie cases where either the claim to title
is weak, the Aboriginal right is limited, or the potential for infringement
is minor.29 In such instances the duty on the Crown would be limited to
giving notice, disclosing information, and discussing any issues raised
in response to the notice. At the other end of the spectrum lie strong
prima facie cases, where the right and potential infringement is significant, and the risk of non-compensable damages is high.30 At that end of
the spectrum, the consultation would have to be “deep” requiring the
opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal participation
by the relevant Aboriginal group in the decision-making process, and
the provision of written reasons demonstrating that the Aboriginal concerns were considered and explaining how those submissions impacted
on the decision.
Over and above consultation, the accommodation of an Aboriginal
assertion is mandated in instances where there is a strong prima facie
case for the claim and where the consequences of the government’s
proposed action may adversely affect the interests subsumed within that
claim in a significant way. The Court spoke of accommodation as an
interlocutory or quasi-injunctive measure that would avoid irreparable
harm or that would minimize the effects of infringement, pending final
26
27
28
29
30

Haida, [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, at para. 37.
Supra, note 19; Haida, id., para. 40ff.
Id., at para. 41.
Id., at para. 43.
Id., at para. 44.
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resolution of the underlying claim. Following a review of dictionary
definitions of the term “accommodation,” the Court concluded:
The accommodation that may result from pre-proof consultation is just
this — seeking compromise in an attempt to harmonize conflicting
interests and move further down the path of reconciliation. 31

(c) Provincial Jurisdiction and the Capacity to Act Honourably
An essential element in the overall analytical framework is the implicit and explicit role of provincial governments. Consistent with the
observations in Delgamuukw that provinces could infringe section 35
rights with the appropriate justification measures, the Court reminded
everyone that by virtue of section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and
implicitly, sections 92(5) and (13) of the same Act, the provinces have
the necessary tools to effect consultation. Contrary to Professor
McNeil’s suggestion that provinces might not have the jurisdiction to
infringe Aboriginal title for the purposes of resource development,32 the
Court could have, but chose not to question provincial jurisdiction.
Rather than dispute provincial ownership of its lands, it concluded that
through their legislative authority over provincial resources, governments could incorporate legal requirements to meet their constitutional
obligations. In echoing the need for relevant legislation to provide guidance on consultation,33 the Court mapped out the path that governments
ought to follow to balance the societal interests of the “distinctive Aboriginal societies” with the broader political community of which they are
part.34

31

Id., at para. 49.
Professor McNeil relies heavily on R. v. Dick, [1985] S.C.J. No. 62, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309
and in particular, the obiter at 321-22 that provincial legislation regulating rights would have to be
read down because of s. 91(24). That obiter however was held to be incorrect in R. v. Côté, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 and in Delgamuukw. Cases such as Kitkatla Band v. British
Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R.
146 and even Paul reflect little if any appetite to limit provincial jurisdiction. And even if that were
to happen, there is a good chance that by operation of the Indian Act the provincial laws would
likely be referentially incorporated to avoid any disruption or a vacuum in the relevant legislation.
33
This was first raised in R. v. Côté, supra, note 32.
34
Supra, note 19, at para. 161.
32
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(d) The Obligations of Aboriginal Claimants
Consistent with its overall view of reconciliation as a process of
give and take, of compromise, and of harmony, the Court was clear that
good faith conduct is required on both sides. It specifically noted that
Aboriginal claimants must neither frustrate reasonable good faith efforts
to consult nor take unreasonable positions “to thwart government from
making decisions or acting in cases, where despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached.”35 Although the Court’s commentary on
what constitutes good faith conduct on the part of Aboriginal claimants
is limited, it clearly noted that claimants can facilitate the process by
outlining their claims with clarity and focusing on the scope and nature
of the Aboriginal rights being asserted as well as the alleged infringements.36 This would likely include the requirement that claimants respond to government notices and invitations to consult in a timely
manner, that they offer sufficient information to the government to enable the assessment of the strength of a particular assertion, and that they
articulate how a contemplated government action might impact on the
asserted right.
In the absence of such information, even with the best of good faith
intentions by a government, it would be virtually impossible to effect
any meaningful consultation. It should also be noted that in linking the
strength of the assertion with the extent of the potential infringement,
the Court drew a direct relationship between the two. That is, the assertion must be credible, the underlying claim must be more than dubious,
and the likelihood that the contemplated government action might infringe must also be articulated. If the contemplated government activity
does not amount to an infringement then the consultation would fall at
the low end of the spectrum. While it is fair to agree that the only way to
really assess both variables of the equation is through dialogue, that
cannot be done, and consultation cannot be meaningful, without the
participation of all sides.

35
36

Haida, supra, note 26, at para. 42.
Id., at para. 36.
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III. HAIDA NATION AND TAKU RIVER TLINGIT FIRST NATION AGAINST
THE BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The Court’s emphasis on the honour of the Crown and the duty to
consult and, in some instances, accommodate in the face of credible but
unproven or uncertain rights is significant, and the meaning of the two
judgments read together should not be underestimated. By extension,
however, the suggestion that these judgments have completely changed
the jurisprudence as it concerns Aboriginal issues obscures this Court’s
concept of reconciliation.
Reconciliation in the Aboriginal discourse is not new.37 What is new
is the Court’s view of reconciliation in Crown-Aboriginal relations as an
ongoing process of living together involving mutual recognition and
respect. The process of information exchanges, of meaningful discussion, of participation in decision-making, the understanding of various
perspectives, the flexibility, and the give and take required to accommodate Aboriginal interests grow out of the Court’s vision of how the Constitution operates as a whole to effect unity within a plane of diversity.
The vision of reconciliation as a critical constitutional value to democracy was considered extensively in the Secession Reference case.38
In that instance, the Court used the Constitution as its touchstone to
respond to various questions concerning a future secession by Quebec.
Its essential approach to the problem was to view Canadian constitutional democracy “as a ‘global system of rules and principles’ for the
‘reconciliation of diversity with unity’ by means of ‘continuous processes’ of democratic discussion, negotiation and change.”39 The outcome was to direct the parties to work within the confines of the
Constitution to develop a complex set of practices in which the conflicts
over the recognition of diversity and the requirements of unity would be
conciliated over time.40
The Court grounded constitutional reconciliation on four vital and
underlying constitutional principles that act in symbiosis such that one

37

See e.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; Delgamuukw,
supra, note 19.
38
[1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
39
See “The Unattainable Yet Attainable Democracy: Canada and Quebec Face the New
Century”, J. Tully, The Desjardins Lecture, McGill University (23 March 2000).
40
Id., at p. 4.
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cannot trump the others: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and
the rule of law, and respect for minority rights.41 Taken together:
The principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the
delineation of spheres of jurisdiction, the scope of rights and
obligations, and the role of our political institutions. Equally
important, observance of and respect for these principles is essential to
the ongoing process of constitutional development and evolution of
our Constitution as a “living tree.”42

Working through the specific principles, the Court concluded:
Our political and constitutional practice has adhered to an underlying
principle of federalism, and has interpreted the written provisions of
the Constitution in this light.43
…
In interpreting our Constitution, the courts have always been
concerned with the federalism principle, inherent in the structure of
our constitutional arrangements, which has from the beginning been
the lodestar by which the courts have been guided.44

And building on that, the Court stated:
[T]here can be little doubt that the principle of federalism remains a
central organizational theme of our Constitution. Less obviously,
perhaps, but certainly of equal importance, federalism is a political and
legal response to underlying social and political realities.45

Blending federalism with the principles of democracy, the Court
then noted:
A federal system of government enables different provinces to pursue
policies responsive to the particular concerns and interests of people in
that province. At the same time, Canada as a whole is also a
democratic community in which citizens construct and achieve goals
on a national scale through a federal government acting within the
41
42
43
44
45

Supra, note 38, at para. 49.
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limits of its jurisdiction. The function of federalism is to enable
citizens to participate concurrently in different collectivities and to
pursue goals at both a provincial and a federal level. 46

The weaving of these principles culminated in the view of reconciliation as an essential requirement for the operation of a democratic system of government. The contours of reconciliation were explained in the
following way:
Finally, we highlight that a functioning democracy requires a
continuous process of discussion. The Constitution mandates
government by democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable
to them, “resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion
and the interplay of ideas” (Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, at
p. 330). At both the federal and provincial level, by its very nature, the
need to build majorities necessitates compromise, negotiation, and
deliberation. No one has a monopoly on truth, and our system is
predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best
solutions to public problems will rise to the top. Inevitably, there will
be dissenting voices. A democratic system of government is
committed to considering those dissenting voices, and seeking to
acknowledge and address those voices in the laws by which all in the
community must live.47

And so as to remove any doubt that this process of discussion might be
limited to a federal-provincial context, the Court specifically turned its
mind to section 35(1) noting that section’s explicit role of protecting
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.48
With the above as the model for dialogue within the Constitution,
the Court also made some significant comments about the role of the
courts generally in the assessment of constitutional disputes and resolutions. Albeit in the context of potential secession negotiations, the Court
cautioned that a court would not have access to all of the information
available to political actors. It also noted that the methods appropriate
for the search for truth in a court of law were ill-suited to understanding
and drawing conclusions over constitutional negotiations. It concluded
that:

46
47
48

Id., at para. 66.
Id., at para. 68.
Id., at para. 82.
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…it is the obligation of the elected representatives to give concrete
form to the discharge of their constitutional obligations which only
they and their electors can ultimately assess. The reconciliation of the
various legitimate constitutional interests outlined above is necessarily
committed to the political rather than the judicial realm, precisely
because that reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and
take of the negotiation process. Having established the legal
framework, it would be for the democratically elected leadership of
the various participants to resolve their differences. 49

The noted remarks in the Secession Reference explain much about
the unspoken premises that inform the proposed solution to the challenges in Haida and in Taku River. They also offer a glimpse as to what
might follow in future cases.
First, in the face of the resounding confidence in the federal system
and the recognition that the principle of federalism remains an organizational theme of the Constitution, it should come as no surprise that the
Court demonstrated little patience for British Columbia’s submission
that somehow it did not have consultation obligations. It also might
explain why the Court may not be prepared to eclipse the provinces’
control and regulation of their resources by denying them jurisdiction.
Such an approach could jeopardize the underlying principles of federalism, and in particular the division of powers. Confidence in the federal
system and the Constitution is another reason to conclude that the Court
sought to strengthen the existing constitutional paradigm rather than
introduce any significant shifts.
Second, the Court’s very deliberate observation that nobody has a
monopoly on truth, and that seeking to acknowledge and address dissenting voices in the laws of the community reflects tremendous depth
in the content of consultation and reconciliation. It is only when one
appreciates that depth that one can make sense of the following:
Every case must be approached individually. Each must also be
approached flexibly, since the level of consultation required may
change as the process goes on and new information comes to light.
The controlling question in all situations is what is required to
maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation between
the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect to the interests at
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stake. Pending settlement, the Crown is bound by its honour to balance
societal and Aboriginal interests in making decisions that may affect
Aboriginal claims. The Crown may be required to make decision in
the face of disagreement as to the adequacy of its response to
Aboriginal concerns. Balance and compromise will then be
necessary.50

But that depth also brings into focus the complexities and challenges of consultation. When read in conjunction with the Secession Reference case what also comes into focus is the extent to which the honour
of the Crown and the upholding of constitutional values find expression
in consultation and reconciliation.
Third, the Court’s comments on its role in the constitutional discourse finds parallel remarks in Haida and in Taku River. In those
judgments, although the standard of review was not directly an issue,
the Court explained that governments would be held to a standard of
reasonableness, the implication being that Courts should not second
guess the assessment and conclusion of the decision makers. So long as
reasonable efforts to consult were made by governments, they would be
seen to discharge their duties. While it is fair to conclude that the Court
will expect governments to follow its strong invitation to provide guidelines to decision makers, to use their legislative powers as necessary to
respond to Aboriginal interests and to promote reconciliation, for the
same reasons that the Court stated that it was ill-suited to assess the
outcome of constitutional negotiation, the Court will likely be reluctant
to second guess Aboriginal consultation processes.

IV. ACHIEVING RECONCILIATION
The glaring question in this discourse is whether the reconciliation
envisioned by the Supreme Court in these two judgments can work in
the context of Aboriginal issues. The Court’s model implies that the
Aboriginal group advancing an assertion and the relevant government
decision makers, in conjunction in many cases with third party proponents, can evaluate the strength and credibility of the assertion, reach
agreement on the scope and content of the assertion, and then fashion
interim arrangements that presumably minimize the impact on the
50
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482

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

asserted rights, but in most instances, enable the particular activity to
proceed.
As straightforward as that might sound, it is far from clear that the
proposed efforts can unfold smoothly to effect reconciliation. A number
of reasons inform this conclusion. First, the content of reconciliation,
i.e., the give and take, the compromise, and/or the sharing, is premised
on an equality of positions and an equality of bargaining power. Although, in the appropriate factual circumstances the honour of the Crown
may require a government to extend the appropriate resources to an
Aboriginal group to enable the requisite dialogue, it is far from certain
that such would be enough to level the playing field. Empowerment,
capacity building and respect are the kinds of elements that are essential
to the success of reconciliation. That however cannot occur overnight.
Second, the time required to effect reconciliation is typically entirely out of step with the timelines involved in the authorization of government activities. Coming to terms with the content, extent, and scope
of an assertion cannot be something that is rushed. By extension, however, the financial exigencies that inform third party development and
activities that governments are asked to authorize mandate very different
time requirements. Neither judgment offers any guidance on how to
bridge the time gaps. If the timelines in Taku River are to be the measure, the inevitable question is how many parties, Aboriginal and nonAboriginal proponents alike, have the financial means to stay a three
and one half year course? And in the face of significant fiscal challenges, can it really be said that taxpayers, through their governments, are in
any better position to shoulder the burden?
Third, it is far from certain that the lowering of the consultation
threshold will advance dialogue, reduce the prospects of litigation and
promote reconciliation. For all the good faith conduct that a government
may demonstrate and for all the guidance that an Aboriginal party may
offer, there may still be a fundamental disagreement over the validity,
the content, the scope, and the implications of an asserted right. The
determination of the strength of an assertion is an essential prerequisite
to any negotiation. But not every assertion carries with it the kind of
prima facie strength reflected in Haida. What consultation does, is to
bring on the consideration of issues sooner rather than later. But if progress cannot be made and the parties end up in court, those are hardly
circumstances that can foster the kind of give and take envisioned by the
Court and required for reconciliation.
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The fourth and perhaps most challenging dimension to reconciliation comes back to the issue of uncertainty. To the Court, uncertainty
did not appear to be a problem because it viewed the reconciliation as an
ongoing process. But in practical terms such uncertainty makes it very
difficult to make any real progress. The Court described interim arrangements and accommodation as quasi-injunctive in nature. But that
carries the serious implication that when the assertions are finally determined, those interim measures may or may not support the justification requirements of section 35. The situation would be less of a
problem if the interim arrangements exceeded the requirements of justification. The same could not be said if the interim arrangements fell
short of justification. In such situations, in the absence of some agreement concerning the future requirements of justification, the Aboriginal
claimants would likely seek damages for any shortfall. Depending on
the issue at stake that could have severe implications for governments.
In the face of such prospects, what incentive would there be to work
towards practical certainty? And if the further implication is that parties
could not get beyond interim agreements and interim accommodation
measures, would that really foster reconciliation or would it perpetuate a
status quo that is less than satisfactory?

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Perhaps only time will tell how well reconciliation will fare in the
Aboriginal discourse. In its observation that the content of consultation
cannot be prescribed, that future cases will fill in the contours and content of consultation, it is clear that the Court was under no illusion about
the challenges that lie ahead. But not every consultation has to be a
problem. It is possible that through ongoing and deliberate dialogue that
is premised on good faith efforts to accomplish mutual respect and mutual understanding, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people alike can
work towards reconciliation. And although such efforts take time, perhaps the Court’s overriding objective was to signal that time was running out, and that the parties had to move forward in the direction of
reconciliation. Even in the face of significant differences the Court is
asking parties to forget about being negative and impeding dialogue. It
urges everyone to work together to achieve positive results. That as an
objective is an essential first step that ought not to be ignored. Chief
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Justice Lamer said in Delgamuukw that, “we are all here to stay.”51 The
judgments in Haida and Taku River ask everyone to make it work.

51

[1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 186.

